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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Transmission experiments support clade-level differences in the transmission
and pathogenicity of Cambodian influenza A/H5N1 viruses
Paul F. Horwood a,b, Thomas Fabrizio c, Srey Viseth Horma, Artem Metlin a, Sopheaktra Rosa,
Songha Toka, Trushar Jeevanc, Patrick Seilerc, Phalla Ya, Sareth Ritha, Annika Suttiea,d, Philippe Buchy a,e,
Erik A. Karlsson a, Richard Webby c and Philippe Dussart a
aVirology Unit, Institut Pasteur du Cambodge, Institut Pasteur International Network, Phnom Penh, Cambodia; bCollege of Public Health,
Medical and Veterinary Sciences, James Cook University, Townsville, Australia; cDepartment of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children’s
Research Hospital, Memphis, TN, USA; dSchool of Applied and Biomedical Sciences, Federation University, Churchill, Australia;
eGlaxoSmithKline Vaccines R&D Intercontinental, Singapore, Singapore
ABSTRACT
Influenza A/H5N1 has circulated in Asia since 2003 and is now enzootic in many countries in that region. In Cambodia, the
virus has circulated since 2004 and has intermittently infected humans. During this period, we have noted differences in
the rate of infections in humans, potentially associated with the circulation of different viral clades. In particular, a
reassortant clade 1.1.2 virus emerged in early 2013 and was associated with a dramatic increase in infections of
humans (34 cases) until it was replaced by a clade 2.3.2.1c virus in early 2014. In contrast, only one infection of a
human has been reported in the 6 years since the clade 2.3.2.1c virus became the dominant circulating virus. We
selected three viruses to represent the main viral clades that have circulated in Cambodia (clade 1.1.2, clade 1.1.2
reassortant, and clade 2.3.2.1c), and we conducted experiments to assess the virulence and transmissibility of these
viruses in avian (chicken, duck) and mammalian (ferret) models. Our results suggest that the clade 2.3.2.1c virus is
more “avian-like,” with high virulence in both ducks and chickens, but there is no evidence of aerosol transmission of
the virus from ducks to ferrets. In contrast, the two clade 1 viruses were less virulent in experimentally infected and
contact ducks. However, evidence of chicken-to-ferret aerosol transmission was observed for both clade 1 viruses. The
transmission experiments provide insights into clade-level differences that might explain the variation in A/H5N1
infections of humans observed in Cambodia and other settings.
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Introduction
The highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV)
A/H5N1 subtype has been a major, global public health
concern since it was first detected in humans in Asia in
1997. In addition, novel subtypes such as the A/H5Nx,
clade 2.3.4.4, and A/H7Nx viruses continue to emerge
in the region [1,2]. Although zoonotic infection of
humans is relatively rare, 861 cases of HPAI A/H5N1
in humans have been reported, with a case fatality
rate of 53% [3]. Human-to-human spread of A/
H5N1 has been suspected on several occasions [4],
but the lack of sustained human-to-human transmissi-
bility prevents A/H5N1 from spreading efficiently and
reduces the risk of a potentially devastating pandemic.
However, a human-transmissible strain of A/H5N1
might emerge in nature through the accumulation of
mutations or via a reassortment event between A/
H5N1 and a human influenza virus [5]. Indeed, exper-
imental infections in ferret models have shown that the
introduction of key substitutions in the hemagglutinin
(HA) gene followed by serial passage of the virus can
result in the accumulation of mutations that enable
aerosol transmission of A/H5N1 between ferrets [6,7].
Influenza subtype A/H5N1 was first detected in
Cambodian poultry in 2004, and it has since become
enzootic in the country and continues to circulate at
high levels in backyard farms and live bird markets
[8]. Between 2004 and 2012, A/H5N1 viruses of clade
1 were the dominant circulating strains in Cambodian
poultry: subclade 1 in 2004–2005; subclade 1.1 in
2006–2008; and subclade 1.1.2 in 2009–2012 [9–11].
In early 2013, a reassortant virus was detected circulat-
ing in Cambodian live bird markets. This virus con-
tained the HA and neuraminidase (NA) genes from
the previously circulating subclade 1.1.2 viruses and
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group, on behalf of Shanghai Shangyixun Cultural Communication Co., Ltd
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Paul Horwood paul.horwood@jcu.edu.au College of Public Health, Medical and Veterinary Sciences, James Cook University, Townsville,
QLD 4811, Australia; Philippe Dussart pdussart@pasteur-kh.org Virology Unit, Institut Pasteur du Cambodge, 5 Monivong Blvd, PO Box 983, Phnom
Penh, Cambodia
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/22221751.2020.1792353
Emerging Microbes & Infections
2020, VOL. 9
https://doi.org/10.1080/22221751.2020.1792353
internal genes from clade 2.3.2.1a virus [10]. A dra-
matic increase in cases of A/H5N1 in humans in Cam-
bodia coincided with the emergence of this reassortant
strain, resulting in 26 cases in humans during 2013 and
a further 8 cases in the first 3 months of 2014 [12]. The
reassortant virus was subsequently replaced by clade
2.3.2.1c viruses in March 2014 and has not been
detected since. Interestingly, since the introduction of
the clade 2.3.2.1c virus to Cambodia, there has been
only one reported case of A/H5N1 infection in a
human in that country, despite consistently high levels
of circulation of the virus in local poultry populations
[8,13,14]. In the current study, we examined the
avian and mammalian transmissibility of Cambodian
A/H5N1 isolates in an effort to account for the increase
in cases in humans during 2013–2014, which was
associated with the circulation of the clade 1.1.2 reas-
sortant virus, and the curious lack of cases in humans
since the introduction of the clade 2.3.2.1c virus.
Materials and methods
Viral strains
Three Cambodian influenza A/H5N1 isolates were used
in this study to represent the three dominant strains that
have circulated in that country since 2009: (1) A/Cam-
bodia/W0526301/2012 (clade 1.1.2); (2) A/Cambodia/
X0817302/2013 (clade 1.1.2 reassortant, with clade
2.3.2.1a internal genes); and (3) A/Duck/Cambodia/
Y0210303/2014 (clade 2.3.2.1c). The same viral isolates
were used in the experiments undertaken at the Institute
Pasteur in Cambodia (IPC) (Phnom Penh, Cambodia)
and at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital (St. Jude)
(Memphis, Tennessee, USA). The full genomes of the
clade 1 viruses (W0526301 and X0817302) included in
this study have been previously published [10]. The gen-
ome of the clade 2.3.2.1c virus has also been previously
published [15]. The accession numbers and other rel-
evant information for all three viruses are included in
Supplementary Table 1.
Ethics statement
For the studies performed at the IPC, all procedures
were approved by the National Ethics Committee in
accordance with international regulations on Animal
Care and Use. For the studies performed at St. Jude,
all procedures were approved by the St. Jude Children’s
Research Hospital Institutional Biosafety Committee
(IBC) and Animal Care and Use Committee
(IACUC) and were in compliance with the Guide for
the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. These guide-
lines were established by the Institute of Laboratory
Animal Resources and were approved by the Govern-
ing Board of the US National Research Council.
Laboratory facilities
All infection experiments at both facilities were con-
ducted in Biosafety Level 3 enhanced containment lab-
oratories. Investigators were required to wear
appropriate protective equipment and to follow all
necessary precautions in accordance with enhanced bio-
safety. Ducks and chickens were housed in HEPA-
filtered, negative-pressure, animal isolators. For
chicken-to-ferret transmission studies, all animals were
housed in open cages with food and water ad libitum.
The cages were separated by approximately 15 cm and
were contained within a flexible film isolator (Class Bio-
logically Clean, Ltd.) maintained under constant nega-
tive pressure with HEPA-filtered supply and exhaust.
Duck-to-duck transmission
For each study virus, three 6-week-old mallard ducks
(Anas platyrhynchos) (donors) were inoculated with
104 50% chicken lethal infectious doses (LD50) of A/
H5N1 in a volume of 200 μL via intranasal inoculation.
Four hours post inoculation, six uninfected 6-week-old
mallard ducks (contacts) were placed together with
individual infected donors in animal isolators. All
birds were monitored daily for clinical signs of disease,
morbidity, and mortality. Oropharyngeal and rectal
swabs were collected from all animals daily, and
serum samples were collected on days –3, 0, 1, 3, 7,
10, 15, 20, 25, and 28 post contact. Organ samples
(from trachea, lung, air sac, liver, spleen, kidney,
heart, intestine, brain, muscle, and feathers) were col-
lected from each animal upon death or at day 28 post
contact.
Nucleic acids were extracted from all swabs and
organ samples by using the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini
Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) in accordance with the
manufacturer’s instructions. Extracts were screened for
influenza A matrix (M) gene RNA by using real-time
RT-qPCR protocols from the International Reagent
Resource (https://www.internationalreagentresource.
org/Home.aspx). Viral RNA levels were quantified
using serial dilutions of an influenza A/H5N1 standard,
enumerated by plaque assay.
Avian serum samples were screened for anti-A/
H5N1 antibodies by hemagglutination inhibition (HI)
assays, using 0.5% chicken red blood cells and per-
formed according to previously described protocols
[16,17]. Briefly, influenza A/H5N1 viral antigens
from each of the study viruses were standardized to 4
HA units/25 µL. The HI titration end-point was
defined as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of
virus that caused complete hemagglutination. All
birds were also screened for anti–influenza A anti-
bodies by HI assay 3 days before the experiments com-
menced to rule out previous exposure to the virus.
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Duck-to-chicken transmission
Each study virus was intranasally inoculated into three
6-week-old mallard ducks (donors), using the proto-
cols outlined above. Four hours post inoculation, six
uninfected 6-week-old chickens (Gallus gallus, native
Cambodian chickens) (contacts) were placed in animal
isolators with individual infected ducks. The exper-
imental protocol was performed as outlined in the
duck-to-duck transmission experiments described
above.
Chicken-to-ferret transmission
For each study virus, three 3- to 4-month-old ferrets
(Triple F Farms, Sayre PA) (donors) were intranasally
inoculated with 104 chicken LD50 of A/H5N1 in a
volume of 200 μL. Twenty-four hours after inoculation
(1 d post infection [dpi]), one ferret from each virus
group was individually cohoused with a single
influenza-naïve ferret (to mimic contact transmission)
and placed alongside another influenza-naïve animal
that shared the same airspace but was separated from
the other ferret by a double-layer wire mesh to prevent
direct interaction (and thereby permit only airborne
transmission).
To further test the zoonotic potential of the viruses,
104 50% chicken LD50 of A/H5N1 of each study virus,
in a volume of 200 μL, was inoculated into three white
leghorn chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) via the
natural route. After 24 h, four naïve chickens were
placed in the cage with each inoculated chicken (to
mimic contact transmission) and a cage of three
naïve ferrets was placed at a distance of approximately
0.3 m from a cage of white leghorn chickens (to mimic
conditions permitting airborne zoonotic transmission).
For both sets of experiments, nasal washes were taken
from each ferret at 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 dpi. Oropharyngeal
and cloacal swabs were collected from all chickens at 1,
3, 5, and 7 dpi or until the terminal endpoint, and
serum samples were collected from ferrets at 20 or
21 dpi. Infectious virus titres were determined for
each nasal wash and oropharyngeal swab by 50% tissue
culture infectious dose (TCID50) assays, using limiting
dilution on MDCK cells and the calculation method of
Reed and Muench [18]. HI assays were conducted as
described above to determine whether ferrets had
seroconverted.
Results
A/H5N1 viruses transmit efficiently between
poultry
For data analysis, the poultry were allocated to one of
three groups for each of the study viruses: experimen-
tally infected donor ducks (n = 6, including three ducks
infected in the duck-to-duck experiments and three
ducks infected in the duck-to-chicken experiments),
contact ducks (n = 6), and contact chickens (n = 6).
Contact exposure of chickens resulted in 100% mor-
tality with all three A/H5N1 viruses tested. For contact
chickens exposed to clade 1.1.2, clade 1.1.2 reassortant,
or clade 2.3.2.1c virus, the mean time to mortality was
8.2, 5.5, and 4.8 days, respectively. Experimental and
contact exposure to the clade 2.3.2.1c virus resulted
in 100% mortality in ducks. In comparison, the clade
1.1.2 virus caused 50% mortality in both experimen-
tally infected ducks and contact ducks, and the clade
1.1.2 reassortant virus caused 50% and 16.8% mortality
in experimentally infected ducks and contact ducks,
respectively (Figure 1). For ducks infected with or
exposed to clade 1.1.2, clade 1.1.2 reassortant, or
clade 2.3.2.1c virus, the mean time to mortality for
experimentally infected ducks was 5.7 (n = 3/6), 8.3
(n = 3/6), and 6.3 (n = 6/6) days, respectively, and
that for contact ducks was 7 (n = 3/6), 9 (n = 1/6),
and 9 (n = 6/6) days, respectively. In contrast to the
outcomes in ducks, contact exposure of chickens
resulted in 100% mortality with all three A/H5N1
viruses tested. The mean time to mortality for contact
chickens exposed to clade 1.1.2, clade 1.1.2 reassortant,
or clade 2.3.2.1c virus was 9.2 (n = 6/6), 6.5 (n = 6/6),
and 5.8 (n = 6/6) days, respectively.
Viral shedding, as determined by the detection of
viral RNA by qRT-PCR, was consistently higher in
ducks and chickens infected with the clade 1.1.2 reas-
sortant virus than in birds infected with either of the
other two viruses tested (Figure 2). Persistent shedding
of viral RNA was also detected in ducks infected with
either of the clade 1 viruses, with high levels of virus
still being detected in the oropharyngeal and cloacal
swabs of some animals at day 28. Persistent shedding
from ducks infected with the clade 2.3.2.1c virus
could not be assessed because all experimentally
infected ducks died by day 9 and all contact ducks
died by day 14. All three viruses caused systemic infec-
tions in all experimental animals, and persistent infec-
tion of multiple internal organs was detected in animals
throughout the study (Figure S1). All ducks had posi-
tive seroconversion to the challenge virus (Figure S2);
however, seroconversion was not detected in any of
the chickens, presumably because they died before
antibodies could be detected. Viral levels were univer-
sally high in all organs in contact chickens.
Contact transmission of A/H5N1 viruses from
poultry to ferrets
The chicken data analysis was performed using three
groups of chickens, with five chickens for each study
virus (n = 15 chickens in total). Each virus was inocu-
lated into three chickens, with four naïve contact chick-
ens being provided for each inoculated chicken.
Additionally, there was one naïve aerosol contact ferret
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for each group of five chickens per test virus (n = 3 fer-
rets in total).
All three viruses were lethal in chickens within 3
days of inoculation, and all contact chickens exposed
to the clade 1.1.2 or clade 2.3.2.1c virus succumbed
to the infection (Figure 1). Only one contact chicken
survived in the clade 1.1.2 reassortant virus group,
and no virus was detected in the oropharyngeal or cloa-
cal swabs of this animal at any time point (Figure 3).
Although there were no detectable viral titres in nasal
washes collected from chicken aerosol contact ferrets
(data not shown), two of the chicken aerosol contact
ferrets in the clade 1.1.2 virus group (#1028 and
#1029) and one of the ferrets in the chicken aerosol
group for the clade 1.1.2 reassortant virus (#1118)
had to be euthanized after developing severe neurologic
signs (Figure 4), possibly associated with systemic
influenza infection. Additionally, one of three directly
inoculated ferrets (#1109) in the clade 1.1.2 reassortant
virus group also succumbed to the infection. Interest-
ingly, this occurred at 8 dpi and after detectable viral
titres in the nasal wash had decreased to the limit of
detection. No viral titres were detected in the nasal
washes of any of the direct contact (ferret–ferret) or
aerosol contact ferrets for any of the three test viruses
(Figure 4).
Similar to the ferret-to-ferret experiment, chicken
aerosol exposed and inoculated ferrets in the clade
1.1.2 and clade 1.1.2 reassortant virus groups exhibited
weight loss and intermittent increase in body tempera-
ture indicative of influenza infection, but no virus was
detected (Figure S3). The ferrets with the most weight
loss were the ones euthanized.
To determine whether the zoonotic transmission of
the clade 1.1.2 and clade 1.1.2 reassortant viruses was
significant, the experiments were repeated with the
same animal arrangements. As expected, all chickens
succumbed to the infections in 2–4 dpi while shedding
large amounts of virus, as detected by both the oro-
pharyngeal and cloacal swabs, and there was no detect-
able virus in the nasal washes of all three ferrets in each
test virus group (Figure S4). However, in contrast to the
first experiments, no clinical signs were observed in
chicken aerosol contact ferrets during the repeat
experiments.
Clade 1.1.2 virus infection in ferrets results in
systemic spread without detectable viral
shedding in nasal washes
Exposure to the clade 1.1.2 virus resulted in severe
clinical signs in ferrets exposed to infected chickens
but there was no detectable virus in their nasal washes;
therefore, we wanted to assess whether this virus was
capable of systemic spread without nasal shedding.
To test this, three ferrets were inoculated with three
different viral titrations ranging from 104 to 106
TCID50/mL and nasal washes were collected at 1 and
3 dpi followed by tissue collection at 4 dpi. Nasal
washes from the ferret inoculated with 106 TCID50/
ml had detectable viral titres at both 1 and 3 dpi; how-
ever, the titre was low and appeared to decrease from
1 dpi to 3 dpi. The two ferrets inoculated with 104
and 105 TCID50, respectively, had nasal wash viral
titres at or below the limit of detection at both 1 and
3 dpi (Figure 5). Interestingly, despite the low viral
load detected in the nasal washes, virus titres were rela-
tively high in the nasal turbinates of all of the animals,
as well as in four individual lung lobes and in the brains
of two of the three ferrets, despite the different inocu-
lum titres (Figure 5).
Figure 1. Poultry survival curves comparing three influenza A/
H5N1 viral clades. IPC: Institute Pasteur in Cambodia; St Jude:
St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital.
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Discussion
Avian influenza A/H5N1 viruses of the Goose/Guan-
dong/96-lineage have spread to more than 70 countries
around the globe and are now considered enzootic in
domestic birds in China, Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa [19]. Over time, this avian influenza
virus lineage has evolved to form 10 recognized clades
and many more subclades [20], all of which can be
traced back to the original HA gene isolated from a
goose in Southern China in 1996 [21]. Some of these
clades have displayed fitness for sustained circulation
in poultry, whereas others have quickly disappeared
from circulation. In addition, it appears that some
viral clades have displayed a greater ability to jump
the species gap and infect humans [22]. Despite the
apparent differences between A/H5N1 clades and sub-
clades with respect to their fitness in poultry and mam-
mals, few in vivo studies have been conducted to
compare directly the virulence and transmission of
these different groups of viruses.
In the present study, the clade 1 viruses displayed
lower virulence in ducks and greater poultry-to-mam-
mal transmissibility than did the clade 2.3.2.1c virus.
These characteristics are consistent with viruses that
have a greater pandemic risk, which is supported by
the greater number of infections of humans by the
Figure 2. Detection of influenza A(H5N1) RNA in oropharyngeal (OP) and cloacal (Clo) swabs of experimentally infected ducks,
contact ducks, and contact chickens.
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clade 1 viruses, as compared to clade 2.3.2.1 viruses,
reported in Cambodia and globally [22]. Poultry-to-
mammal aerosol transmission was suspected with
both of the clade 1 viruses. Severe neurological illness
was observed in two ferrets exposed to clade 1.1.2
virus–infected chickens and in one ferret exposed to
clade 1.1.2 reassortant virus–infected chickens (in
addition to one ferret directly infected with the clade
1.1.2 reassortant virus). However, A/H5N1 virus was
not detected in the nasal washes from any of these ani-
mals. A repeat of this experiment with clade 1 viruses
did not result in clinical signs suggestive of A/H5N1
infection or in any detectable virus in the ferret nasal
washes, suggesting that zoonotic transmission of
these viruses requires specific conditions and is not a
frequent occurrence. There was no contact or aerosol
transmission of the clade 1 viruses between ferrets.
This is similar to what is seen in nature, where the
avian virus can cross the species barrier but cannot
transmit further. However, relatively high levels of
virus were detected in the nasal washes of ferrets exper-
imentally infected with the clade 1.1.2 reassortant virus.
Increased levels of upper respiratory tract replication
could be an indication of greater affinity for mamma-
lian cell receptors [23]. The greater shedding of the
reassortant virus from infected ducks and chickens,
coupled with the relatively high levels of virus in the
nasal turbinates of infected ferrets and evidence of
intermittent aerosol transmission of the virus between
poultry and mammals, indicates that further in vitro
and in vivo experiments are necessary to derive an
in-depth virological risk assessment of the Cambodian
clade 1.1.2 reassortant viruses. Genomic analyses con-
ducted in previous studies [10] and in the present study
(Supplementary Table 1) did not reveal any mutations
that may have been responsible for the increased risk of
mammalian infection with the clade 1.1.2 reassortant
virus.
Figure 3. Chicken viral titres in oropharyngeal and cloacal
swabs during transmission experiments.
Figure 4. Ferret viral titres detected from nasal washes.
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Clade 2.3.2.1 viruses first emerged in 2008 [24] and
have since spread and diversified to become one of the
dominant lineages of A/H5N1 viruses globally. The
clade 2.3.2.1c lineage was first detected in Cambodia
in February 2014, replacing the previously circulating
clade 1.1.2 reassortant virus to become the only
influenza A/H5N1 virus circulating in that country
and remaining so up to the present (March 2020)
[8,10]. A/H5N1 virus infections in humans have dra-
matically decreased (with only one confirmed case)
since the introduction of this virus into Cambodia.
Meanwhile, live bird market surveillance and poultry
outbreak investigations have established that high
levels of clade 2.3.2.1c viruses have circulated in poultry
populations during this time [14], suggesting that this
virus is less able than its predecessors to jump the
species gap into humans. Global data appear to support
this hypothesis, with there being few reports of clade
2.3.2.1c virus infections in humans, despite widespread
poultry circulation in China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and
West Africa [25–29]. The frequent detection of clade
2.3.2.1 viruses in wild birds and their rapid global dis-
semination [24,30] may indicate that these viruses are
more “avian-like,” affecting their ability to infect
humans. Further studies are needed to investigate the
in vivo characteristics of these viruses and the possible
genetic mechanisms associated with their host specifi-
city. Indeed, clade 2.3.2.1 viruses have been signifi-
cantly associated with wild birds, suggesting that
inherent characteristics of that virus subclade may
enhance its ability to establish infection and spread in
some species in the natural reservoir population. In
the present study, the clade 2.3.2.1c virus was consider-
ably more virulent in the duck species used in this
experiment than were either of the clade 1 viruses,
resulting in mortality of all experimentally infected
and contact ducks within 9 days, except for one contact
duck that died on day 14. Previous studies have also
provided evidence that clade 2 viruses have evolved
to be more pathogenic in ducks, by comparison with
their clade 1 ancestors [31], with unusually high mor-
tality rates in duck flocks being reported during out-
breaks [25,32].
The greater virulence of clade 2.3.2.1c viruses in
avian hosts may have come at the cost of less efficient
transmissibility to mammalian hosts. The clade
2.3.2.1c virus did not cause illness in ferrets directly
infected with the virus or in ferrets subjected to aerosol
contact with infected chickens. However, Pearce et al.
[33] described a clade 2.3.2.1c duck isolate from Viet-
nam (Dk/VN/0004) that was highly pathogenic in fer-
rets, suggesting that within-clade genetic differences
also play an important role in pathogenicity, trans-
mission, and host specificity. The authors compared
the sequence of Dk/VN/0004 with another clade
2.3.2.1c isolate that was non-pathogenic in ferrets
and although they noted a number of amino acid
differences (8 in the polymerase genes and 3 in the
HA gene) only one (T188I) has been associated with
increased binding to mammalian receptors [34]. The
recent emergence of clade 2.2.1.2 viruses causing
many cases in humans in Egypt over a short period
[35] and the evolution of reassortant H5Nx viruses
from the 2.3.4.4 lineage [36] show that the perceived
Figure 5. Viral titres detected in the organs of ferrets infected with three different doses of the A (H5N1) clade 1.1.2 virus.
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lower pandemic risk from clade 2 viruses is not univer-
sal and that close monitoring of these viruses is still
needed.
Our findings suggest that some A/H5N1 viruses can
establish persistent infections in ducks. Clade 1 viruses
were detected in multiple organs of all of the ducks
euthanized at day 28 (Supplementary Figure 1), and
cloacal and respiratory shedding were also consistently
detected (Figure 2). Hulse-Post et al. [37] found that
clade 1 viruses (isolated in 1997–2004) were persistently
shed by ducks for up to 17 dpi. Wibawa et al. [38] also
reported persistent detection of viral RNA up to 24 dpi
in ducks experimentally infected with a clade 2.1.1
virus, but infectivity could not be confirmed beyond
10 dpi. Persistent shedding might increase the trans-
mission of these viruses to humans through greater con-
tamination of the environment. Persistent infection of
organs, with the very high levels of virus concentration
detected in the present study, poses a risk for poultry
slaughterers and for people preparing birds for cooking.
In this study, we observed differences in viral shed-
ding and virulence in Cambodian native chickens (Gal-
lus gallus) and leghorns. There is a need for further
validation of these differences. In particular, further
studies are needed to investigate the pathogenicity
and transmission of A/H5N1 and other avian influenza
viruses in native poultry. To date, most avian influenza
transmission studies have been conducted in developed
countries (where the necessary facilities exist), using
avian species that may not accurately represent the
bird species that are common in enzootic countries.
Various studies have documented that individual
viruses can have highly variable pathogenicity in a
range of bird species [39–41].
A limitation of our study was that only one repre-
sentative virus from each clade was included in the
transmission experiments. Within-clade variation in
transmission and virulence is likely and has been
reported previously in transmission experiments [30].
In addition, the two clade 1 viruses were both isolated
from cases of A/H5N1 infection in humans, whereas
the clade 2.3.2.1c virus was isolated from a poultry out-
break associated with the death of approximately 4500
ducks [42]. The prior replication of the clade 1 viruses
in a mammalian (human) host could conceivably have
influenced the transmissibility of these viruses between
avian and mammalian hosts, as compared to that of the
avian clade 2.3.2.1c virus. Only one clade 2.3.2.1c virus
infection of a human has been detected in Cambodia to
date and, unfortunately, no virus could be isolated from
that patient. Despite this possible limitation, none of
the viruses included in the experiments contained criti-
cal mutations (e.g. Q222L and G224S) associated with
mammalian adaptation. Therefore it is likely that the
viruses selected for these experiments reflect the three
main clades of A/H5N1 that have circulated in Cambo-
dia and their risk of transmission to humans.
In this study, we showed differences in avian viru-
lence and avian-to-mammalian transmission between
three successive A/H5N1 clades that have circulated
in Cambodia since 2009. The transmission exper-
iments provided insights into the dramatic increase
in cases in humans after the emergence of the clade
1.1.2 reassortant virus, along with the subsequent pau-
city of cases following the replacement of this virus by a
clade 2.3.2.1c virus. These patterns are consistent with
observations from the field, where a considerable
reduction in cases of A/H5N1 virus infection in
humans has been observed in all countries where
clade 2.3.2.1c viruses are the dominant circulating
clade, despite high levels of ongoing circulation in
domestic poultry populations. Aerosol transmission
of the two clade 1 viruses from poultry to ferrets pro-
vided further support for the hypothesis that these
viruses were more likely to cause human infections
than was the clade 2.3.2.1c virus. In addition, persistent
infections of multiple organs and high levels of virus
shedding were observed in all ducks that survived the
infection with clade 1 viruses. Further studies are
needed to validate these findings and to elucidate the
mechanism of persistence, as this may have impli-
cations for the risk of human exposure and the spread
of A/H5N1 through the poultry trade and migratory
birds.
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